Introduction
The destinies of all people will be controlled by airpower.
-William Mitchell, Winged Defense
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will play a significant role in future operations and the US Air Force must exploit every advantage offered by UAV technology. However, as a warfighting institution, the Air Force must not forget the significant contribution of the human operator. The UAV is a force multiplier and nothing more. UAV technology can not replace the human operator. UAVs will actually increase the requirements for skilled airmen. Airmen are critical to the functioning of the Air Force and they will continue to be well into the next century. To maintain the asymmetric advantage that air power gives our nation, skilled, cunning human operators will be required to handle the uncertainty of war.
The UAV debate was born in WWI but new technology has recently nurtured the argument.
World War I introduced the airplane, manned and unmanned, to the world as a military technology. Manned aircraft were capable of numerous combat duties and became a glamorous weapon of war. Unmanned aircraft were experimental, never achieved any measure of success, and thus were always behind the scenes.
Over the following decades, the manned aircraft flourished as the unmanned aircraft had relatively few advocates. The technology to conduct combat operations from the air matured rapidly. However, the concept of air operations lagged behind aircraft development. Many military leaders failed to foresee the aircraft's strategic value or the vital nature of the battlespace that it laid at their feet. The aircraft threatened the very existence of long established US military organizations. The aircraft was central to Billy
Mitchell's vision of future war. He envisioned the aircraft as a device to eliminate trench warfare and return maneuver to the battlefield. He saw aircraft as the future and purveyor of modern combat operations. 1 The backbone of Mitchell's vision lay in the independent use of airpower to achieve strategic military objectives. His concept of an independent Air Force revolved around a corps of specially trained individuals that he referred to as Knights-of-the-Air. Mitchell's Knights or airmen were elite. They were the sole harbingers of a quality that he referred to as airmindedness. They alone saw the capabilities of airpower: speed, flexibility, and most critically its unique perspective. 2 Mitchell's airmen were operators. They were the pilots and observers (navigators) of World War I. They possessed physical courage and they alone had the capacity to lead an independent air arm. Fifty years after the establishment of the US Air Force, Mitchell's concept of airmen is undergoing some strain.
As Air Force members we look back at Mitchell and view an institutional hero. An individual who had the moral courage to stand for a vision in which he believed. Today there are several concepts that are threatening Mitchell's Knights-of-the-Air. Some, such as Carl Builder, have argued that airmen are actually destroying the Air Force. 3 New technologies and operational concepts are challenging the existence of airmen. Looming on the horizon are unmanned aerial vehicles that will have the capability to carry the fight to the enemy, while airpower theorists such as John Warden, suggest that space based weapons will quickly replace combat aircraft. 4 This research effort is limited in scope. Current international agreements prohibit space based weapons and our information metasystem is only a concept, so this essay will focus specifically on the UAV issue and explore the possibility that airmen will be replaced by unmanned vehicles in the next twenty years. This essay presents arguments for and against UAVs. Advantages in new technology are explored in an attempt to draw conclusions about the future of airmen and the Air Force. This effort examines this issue within an institutional framework, without prejudice, and it is mindful that the real mission of the Air Force is to serve the nation. 2 Mitchell, vii. 3 Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome (New Brunswick, C.N.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 179-188. 4 Col John Warden (Retired), interview with author, 20 Dec 1996.
The Case for Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles
We are heading to a future where combat aircraft will be pilotless drones.
-Ben Rich, Skunk Works
In 1982, the Israeli Air Force overran Syrian defenses in the Bekaa Valley and destroyed the Syrian Air Force in one of the largest air battles since WWII. Key to that victory were small unmanned aircraft used to deceive and destroy the Syrian integrated air defense system. 1 This incident focused world wide military attention on the UAV issue.
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The principal argument for UAVs is that they save lives. Henry C. Yuen, TRW futurist researcher believes that one of the foremost objectives in the development of new weaponry should be the total elimination of human risk. 3 Weapons and equipment that face destruction at the enemy's hand should be unmanned. Unmanned aircraft could be used in any situation. They could fly into extensive defense networks, with no regard for human life and the consequences thereof. The protection of human life has become a paramount concern for US NCA, as public opinion and increased media dissemination play a key role in military operations and thus political and diplomatic endeavors. The Gulf War laid this foundation and set the standard for modern combat operations. The expectations produced by these operations may be unrealistic.
While low casualties are desirable, the expectation that losses will be minimal on a fluid battlefield may inhibit the future use of force as an instrument of national power. The desire to limit casualties may be an American center of gravity. The late Gen Mohammed Farah Aidid undermined US political objectives in Somalia while inflicting less than 2 dozen US casualties. 5 The importance of saving human life has become critical to the success of US military operations. UAVs will save lives. In August of 1995, a Predator UAV was completing a reconnaissance mission in Bosnia when it was shot down in the same area where US Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady was downed two months earlier.
The Predator served as a loyal soldier and hardly a mention of its shoot down was noticeable in the world press. 6 There may be a greatly added political benefit to these life saving drone aircraft.
When they are shot down or fall from the sky they have little impact on the world's political fabric. From the Cold War to the Gulf War, the capture of American airmen has inflamed public debate over war and peace. 16 Removing the pilot and his or her supporting architecture produces a corresponding increase in aircraft performance. 17 Also, the unmanned aircraft will not be limited by the physiological barriers that nature has placed upon the pilot. The UAV would be G force limited by structural engineering, not the ability of the pilot's heart to provide his head with blood under the strain. 18 The UAV with reduced size and increased performance will also have a corresponding reduction in signature and thus is more survivable. The combination was similar to the way the space shuttle is carried piggy back by a 747.
After a fatal accident during flight testing, the B-52 become the operational launch platform. D-21s were used for a short time to penetrate China and fly highly classified reconnaissance missions. 22 The most successful UAV to date has been the cruise missile. 23 The cruise missile is nothing more than an unmanned aircraft on a one-way mission. 24 The cruise missile has its origins in WWI and WWII. During WWI an unmanned aircraft carrying an explosive device was designed. The device was called the Bug and it was designed by the Sperry
Company. 25 The unmanned aircraft flew using a gyroscope based autopilot and an altitude hold system. The Bug was launched from a track and was set to fall on its target after flying a specific heading for a specific amount of time. The Bug provided all the benefits of UAVs: its use did not threaten the life of a pilot; when they were dying at an unprecedented rate, and the cost was low at four hundred dollars to put three hundred pounds of explosive over a target. 26 The war ended before the Bug could be brought to bear on Germany. 27 In WWII the Bug concept was resurrected but it did not have the range to reach Germany from the British Isles. 28 The Allies did not take advantage of this concept but the Germans did. They built the V-1 Buzz Bomb. The V-1 was another predecessor of the cruise missile. 29 The modern day cruise missile is not unlike its ancestors. It flies a pre-planned program to its target where it explodes. Their major difference is how they find their way to the target. The Bug and the V-1 were programmed to fall on their target at a set time.
Timing was based on rate and distance to target. 30 When the clock ran out of predicted flight time, the engine would shutoff and the vehicle would fall on its target and explode. 31 This method was not very accurate. The cruise missile relies on an inertial navigation system upgraded throughout the flight by comparing memorized topographical maps with actual areas of the earth's surface and recently improved with Global Positioning System updates.
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Like the cruise missile, the Predator UAV has been combat tested. Recently acquired by the Air Force, the Predator is a $3 million reconnaissance aircraft that is currently undergoing operational testing in Bosnia. 33 The aircraft is capable of flying at twenty-five thousand feet for up to 50-hours. The aircraft is remotely controlled and relays its video, radar, infrared or elint information to a line-of-sight ground station or to overhead satellites. The Predator embodies all the benefits of the UAV: it eliminates the need for humans to perform high risk or mundane intelligence gathering missions, it is relatively inexpensive, and the aircraft can far outperform any human with its 50-hour endurance.
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The benefits of 4 Gordon, 469-470. yet been enlisted to perform traditional combat roles. 2 The principal opponent to combat
UAVs are the airmen that these vehicles are supposed to remove from harms way. 3 Carl
Builder asserts that the US Air Force has been ill served by airmen and that their unwillingness to accept replacement by robots is rooted in selfish unprofessional behavior:
love of flying and aircraft and/or the desire for a better airline afterlife. 4 To Builder and others, airmen have become the cavalry officers of the late twentieth century. The problem is that many outside the military aviation community do not adequately understand the real role of manned combat aircraft. If the sole function of combat aircraft was to fly to a pre-planned target and deliver ordinance there would be little need for airmen. Airmen contribute much more. The human element provides the system with its very basis for existence. Men and women, in combat aircraft, give us the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and the ability to exploit these changes.
Flexibility and adaptability are human qualities. These qualities are synonymous with airpower. Nothing is as flexible and adaptable as the human being.
Are flexibility and adaptability still required of today's precise computer aided weapon systems? Clausewitz's concept of friction provides the answer to this question.
Friction has an overarching effect on combat operations. It is the only constant in war. A very critical component of this debate is a concept brought to light by Dupuy, Ware, and Watts.
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The American viewpoint of war is narrow and deterministic. 6 Americans historically ignore the very human nature of war. War is nothing more than an engineering problem. The enemy is viewed as a system to be dismantled. 7 War is an equation to be solved, quickly, and efficiently. 8 Underlying this philosophy is the arrogant view that
American war is frictionless. The cornerstone to these beliefs is the total disregard of the enemy as a thinking opponent. 9 Technology can help in this respect, but it has not eliminated Clauswitz's concept of friction and thus flexibility and adaptability are still essential. 10 The human element remains the critical factor that leads to success in war and in the exploitation of technology.
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Even when employing our best technology friction has been a factor. During the Gulf War, with satellites, AWACS, JSTARS, and a complicated C4I network, the US military allowed the entire Hammurabi Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape with its heavy weapons and command element intact. 12 The Iraqi causeway over the Euphrates river was not destroyed or even targeted before the last hours of the war. 13 Friction was a major element in the first information war and played a major role in the failure to totally meet our military objectives.
Using the Gulf War as the standard, Clausewitz's friction will be present and technology will never totally eliminate it. Flexibility and adaptability are as critical today to the conduct of military operations as they were yesterday. This concept is not foreign to the Israeli Air Force, the first air force to bring operational use of UAVs to the world's attention. 14 The ability to see through friction and the inability to totally eliminate it is fundamental to the Israeli military and their operational use of UAVs. 15 The Israeli Air
Force has adopted many German operational concepts from WWII. The Israeli Air Force continues to train pilots as innovative warriors. They rely on the ideas outlined in the German Field Service Regulations of 1933:
Situations in war are of unlimited variety. They change often and suddenly and only rarely are from the first discernible. Incalculable elements are often of great influence. The independent will of the enemy is pitted against ours. Friction and mistakes are of everyday occurrence. 16 Even though they pioneered the use of UAVs in combat, the Israeli Air Force sees UAVs as nothing more than a force enhancement device and a complement to manned combat aircraft. 17 The Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force stated that "the secret weapon of the Israeli Air Force is highly trained people-war is characterized by great uncertainty and the only system capable of the flexibility we require is the human pilot." 18 As stated in AFM 1-1, technology only helps people to win wars. 19 Our reliance on technology has given us great combat advantages but we must realize that technology can also fail. The reality of friction underlines the current need for human initiative, flexibility and adaptability. These qualities are essential now and they were critical when aircraft were first invented. Only humans had the sensor, fusion, and control capabilities to fly them.
Flight control engineers refer to the pilot as an adaptive controller. 23 In this capacity, the pilot is a simple system that interprets various streams of information feedback and makes corrective inputs to keep the aircraft flying in the right direction at the desired altitude.
The pilot does do this. However, the combat pilot's task is much greater. Not only must the pilot control the aircraft but he or she must make tactical decisions in a three dimensional environment based on the situation. The presented situation is rarely static and shaping its fluid nature is the pilot's responsibility. As a decision maker the pilot uses his training and experience to respond to new situations. His or her ability to make the correct decisions is the essence of the pilot's task. In the flying community this ability is often discussed in terms of aggressiveness.
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Initiative, flexibility, adaptability and experience are key attributes that airmen bring the Air Force in its combat role. These characteristics are critical to a strategic air arm. The first example occurred in WWI during an air superiority mission over Cambrai. unmanned combat aircraft make that change or even see the need for a change? Airmen have been using their experience and training to adapt to new situations and teach others how to do the same since aircraft were first flown. This ability is the cornerstone of flexibility and is an essential element of a true airpower nation.
The last examples are both from Desert Storm. They both demonstrate the inherent flexibility and versatility of the manned combat aircraft. During the Gulf War, Capt Ron
Garan was leading an eight ship of F-16 aircraft on a pre-planned strike in Iraq. The initial target was a rebuilt bridge over the Euphrates river. Starting his dive to deliver his weapons, Captain Garan noticed something that was not in the premission briefing intelligence photos. He quickly broke off his attack and directed his flight members into a holding pattern. He informed airborne command elements that a large amount of heavy bridge building equipment was positioned along the banks of the river and some of it was being driven away. He redirected his flights' efforts and quickly established separate targets for each aircraft. Once retargeted, the flight destroyed the bridge, four heavy lift cranes, one dozen bulldozers, several dump trucks, and four armored personnel carriers.
The attack was accomplished just after sunrise. The Iraqis were moving the equipment to a safe location when they were caught off guard. Captain Garan's quick decisions, initiative, and flexibility wiped out a significant amount of Iraqi heavy repair capability.
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The ability to quickly assess the military situation and retarget will be a necessary UAV capability. How will UAVs make these decisions that are made easily by human operators?
Capt Landis Cook was leading a fourship of A-10 aircraft on a pre-planned armed reconnaissance mission in southern Iraq. Shortly after entering his area of responsibility, to war its real war. It is unlikely that the friction of war will ever be eliminated, therefore to adequately serve our nation combat UAVs will have to exhibit human qualities. 
Notes

The Future
It is common place in human affairs that men continue to labor on major undertakings a long time after the ideas upon which these efforts were based have become obsolete.
-Fred Ikle, Every War Must End
The technology required to conduct unmanned combat operations within the atmosphere is very near. The computational power of computers is multiplied 4,000 times every decade and by 2015 10 gigabytes of memory will fit on a crystal smaller than a sugar cube.
1 Jeffrey Barnett predicts in Future War that autonomous weapons using artificial intelligence supported by automatic target recognition algorithms employing multispectral sensors will rule the battlespace. Barnett backs his conclusion with data that predicts that in the next 20 years data fusion rates will be 10,000 times faster and more accurate than they are now and data storage capabilities will be at least 1,000 times greater. 2 These capabilities are predicted to produce computers that mimic thought and maybe even think for themselves with some level of self awareness. 3 This increase in computational power may provide the human qualities of flexibility and adaptability to all types of UAVs.
There are two categories of unmanned aircraft: Man-in-the-loop (MITL) and autonomous. MITL systems have some type of human operational interface. 4 The aircraft is airborne and humans control it from the ground. Predator is an example of this UAV category. On the other hand, autonomous systems takeoff and fly with no human interaction. 5 Autonomous UAVs are further subdivided into programmable or independent systems. Programmable systems fly a pre-planned profile based on a preset software program. Truly autonomous (independent) platforms make the decisions required to complete their mission. 6 DarkStar and the cruise missile are autonomous UAVs. 7 Both types of UAVs offer unique benefits and have unique support requirements.
MITL systems currently offer a greater degree of adaptability as mid-mission inputs allow course, altitude, and/or target flexibility. 8 MITL systems use data-link to communicate with a ground station or relay control signals through satellite systems. 9 Some unusual difficulties have surfaced while operating MITL systems. Mr. Douglas Shane, of Scaled Composite Technologies, states that "direct control of unmanned aircraft inflight has had some surprising results." 10 Originally MITL UAV operations were viewed as relatively stress free. These aircraft were viewed and still are viewed by many as quasi-airplanes.
No direct flight experience was required to operate them and anyone with computer knowledge would be able to "fly" MITL UAVs. 11 Experience has shed new light on the conduct of these operations. MITL direct control unmanned aircraft do not provide the ground operators with the same level of cues and feedback that a manned aircraft provides to its pilot. 12 This lack of situational awareness has led Mr. Shane to comment that "direct control drone operations are surprisingly stressful." 13 During the development of the Raptor UAV, the engineering control team was monitoring a flight that had proceeded into its second 30-hour period. While monitoring the system an aircraft emergency occurred. The engineers flying the aircraft knew that something was very wrong but they could not keep up with the changing data on their screens and had no direct flight experience to rely upon. They failed to realize that the aircraft had rolled onto its back due to a flight control malfunction and flown into the ground. Minutes after the aircraft had impacted the earth the engineers still believed that the aircraft was in its orbit and what they had experienced was a data telemetry failure. 14 The Raptor test team was so effected by this accident that they cut a hole into the top of their second UAV, added a set of cockpit controls, and completed the test phase of their program with a test pilot in the aircraft. 15 Scaled Composite learned what others have been learning as ISR UAVs become more common. Airmen are required to operate these systems to prevent high accident rates. 16 Mitchell's airmindedness is critical even to the operation of unmanned systems. The Raptor accident also taught Scaled Composite that more people are required to support MITL UAVs as opposed to manned aircraft. 17 Due to the lack of inflight feedback cues, several people are required in the ground station to safely monitor the aircraft. Scaled Composite recommends all MITL drone aircraft be controlled by a trained pilot and that his flight crew consist of at least two other people to monitor airborne systems and that high fidelity simulators are required to provide UAV crew proficiency. 18 The Air Force has agreed with these concepts in theory. Predator operations starting at Nellis Air Force Base, in the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, will be controlled by a trained pilot or Weapons Systems Officer. 19 These individuals will be supported by at least two crewmen to monitor other than primary flight control systems. 20 Another major problem associated with MITL UAVs is that some type of signal must go from ground station to aircraft or from ground station to satellite to aircraft. This limits UAV operations as the telemetry signals for each aircraft/ground station must be unique and satellite bandwidth availability does not allow large numbers of UAV aircraft to operate at the same time. 21 The requirement for data link transmissions to operate MITL UAVs creates another difficulty.
Data link or radio control transmissions create a vulnerability. An adversary could jam or engage these signals or take command of the aircraft or at least intercept the downlink to determine what we are observing. 22 Existing high power microwave or EMP technology already presents a significant threat to data link operations.
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A data link controlled robot has already been turned on its operator. While disarming a bomb with an explosives ordinance disposal robot, the bomber successfully jammed the police signal and sent his own signal to drive the robot directly at the officers controlling the device.
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Alvin Toffler believes that any device controlled with radio frequency signals will be vulnerable to this type of interference and to think that our adversaries would not take advantage of this is dangerous. 25 The problem with MITL UAVs or any remotely controlled weapon is that they depend on vulnerable communications. 26 These communication systems link humans to a less intelligent, but highly responsive mechanical system. If these links breakdown, or are disrupted, or sabotaged or, worse yet, manipulated by the enemy, the UAV becomes useless or potentially self destructive.
Like MITL UAVs, autonomous systems have their own problems and benefits.
Independent UAVs will be different from the programmable cruise missile in that a cruise missile is preprogrammed to fly to a point in space. The missile carries out a set of if/then statements. 27 Independent UAVs will have the ability to think. 28 They are built around a complicated set of subsystems: sensors, control and analysis software, and pattern recognition capabilities. 29 The largest benefit is that this type of system does not require a vulnerable line of sight support infrastructure of hardware or personnel. Traditional aircraft maintenance systems will be required but once the system is airborne it will be on its own, free to carry out its specific mission. Independent combat UAVs will need to have what has been referred to as "wetware" or some type of machine intelligence to carry on all of the manned missions that occur today such as armed reconnaissance or air-to-air operations. 30 Computer programming cannot be perfect. The main problem with programmed or independent autonomous UAVs will be their inherent inability to cope with error, surprise and chance-Clausewitz's friction. 42 Because the human mind is so flexible, learning may occur very fast and tactical learning and the spread of that knowledge can occur quickly.
Autonomous UAVs may find it difficult to adapt tactically to various situations and disseminate that information to other autonomous systems. The adaptability and flexibility of the human mind may be hard to replace or at least more trustworthy for the time being. 43 Mr. Dane Hancock of Lockheed-Martin's Tactical Aircraft Systems has stated that:
Preplanned drone operations are easy and hardware is not a problem for autonomous decision making UAVs. Software is the key stepping stone for UAV development. Where do we start the baseline for problem solving? We can teach a system to learn but it needs an experience database upon which to judge and make future assessments. With the availability of sensor equipment we can flood a system with information, but unlike a highly trained pilot or one with a great deal of experience, we rarely know what piece of information is essential at a given time. The situational awareness of the pilot, even when incomplete, is almost impossible to duplicate within a machine. DarkStar is a prime example. 44 Independent UAVs may also present a political problem. Thinking, self-aware robot combat aircraft may violate the Geneva Accords. 45 Armed independent UAVs will present significant diplomatic difficulties as nations decide that they do not want these aircraft operating in their airspace. Downed pilots may represent limited political risk when compared to overflights of armed unmanned aircraft.
The last war is not like the next war. Therefore, the Air Force must expend its limited resources preparing for the next war. MITL systems are vulnerable to exploitation and jamming. Independent autonomous UAVs may present a moral or political dilemma and their programming may not be flexible enough to handle the rigors of combat. Can these difficulties be overcome by focusing on programmable cruise missile type systems?
Many believe that the US Air Force has not applied the correct level of effort to cruise missile technology, including Carl Builder who believes that pilots have drawn attention away from this unmanned weapon. 46 Senior US Navy leadership has stated that cruise missiles are a cheap aircraft replacement. 47 Statements such as these show a lack of understanding of the nature and purpose of the cruise missile. The cruise missile, like the WWI Bug, is a derivative of the manned aircraft. 48 It is an excellent weapon for attacking highly defended, soft, fixed targets. However, the programmable cruise missile is not very flexible. A cruise missile equipped with a conventional warhead is not a hard target penetrator. 49 The warhead is an airburst weapon with a relatively small yield. 50 Like the German V-1 of WWII this weapon can be defeated by anti-air artillery, airborne interceptors, and barrage balloon netting. 51 From June 1944 until March 1945, 10,500 V1s were launched against England only 2,500 penetrated the British air defense network.
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In WWII thin fishing nets suspended below barrage balloons and hung from 200 to 300 foot poles were used to "catch" low flying V-1s, before they reached their high value targets. Modern day cruise missiles approach their targets at an above ground altitude of 100 to 200 feet to maximize blast effectiveness and diminish warning time of height finding radars. 53 A relatively inexpensive net hung some distance from a high value soft target may foil the $1.2 million cruise missile. 54 Who would ring high value targets with fishing net? During WWII, the US sealed harbor facilities with 1.5 inch thick steel antisubmarine netting. In Boston alone, some of this netting went to a depth of 500 feet and covered over 10 miles of harbor access. To increase the capability of the cruise missile it must have a hard target penetrating warhead. A hard target penetrating capability requires a heavier missile. A heavier weapon would require an increase in lift. Suddenly, the missile has entered the vicious cycle of aerodynamic design: more weight requires a greater lifting surface and larger control surfaces these in turn produce more drag and now the missile needs a larger engine and the cycle continues. 57 The desire to give the cruise missile multiple target or re-attack capability yields the same effect. For true autonomy add a human operator and the cruise missile becomes the F-16 and if stealth characteristics are required it becomes an F-117.
The vulnerabilities presented by MITL UAVs, the inherent inflexibility of programmable systems, and the risks associated with independent autonomous UAVs present some large difficulties. These problems do not totally outweigh the benefits of UAVs. They do however, present considerable arguments, when combined with the chaos and uncertainty of war, to continue manned flight operations. The human operator or airman will be required in several future roles. This does not lead to the demise of the UAV. The UAV represents a significant force multiplier and UAV technology should be exploited for all missions, including the most complex, as a complement for manned systems. UAVs should be used in the following areas:
1. When the lethality of the airspace to be penetrated is too great for manned aircraft.
Small inexpensive, non-stealthy UAVs could shut down the enemy integrated air defense system. Manned aircraft could then attack in aircraft carrying the larger ordinance to destroy critical interdiction targets or conduct armed reconnaissance.
2. When the airspace to be penetrated is too politically risky for manned aircraft.
Low observable UAVs could carry on ISR missions in the pre-hostilities phase of a conflict with little risk of downed airmen influencing the diplomatic process.
3. When the airspace to be penetrated is too toxic for human operators. UAVs could perform all missions in nuclear, biological, and/or chemical environments.
4. When lower priority missions could be performed by UAVs to free highly skilled airmen to handle higher priority tasks. Preplanned stationary targets could be destroyed by UAVs while manned aircraft are used to hunt for mobile weapons of mass destruction.
5. When overall mission effectiveness can be increased with UAVs. UAVs could be used to provide constant battlespace surveillance or constant command and control radio link. UAV assets could improve mission effectiveness in any situation where overhead assets are required around the clock or mission requirements exceed human physiological limitations.
At some point in the future UAV and manned aircraft technology may be melted into the same airframe. This "composite airframe" could be manned or unmanned depending on mission requirements. General Fogleman has speculated that later versions of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) may be unmanned.
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Perhaps, the JSF will be our first manned/unmanned composite airframe.
Regardless of airframe type, UAV operations will expand the role of airmen. As more unmanned vehicles are pressed into service airmen will be required to lend their unique expertise (airmindedness) to the teams operating these aircraft. MITL systems will require trained pilots to conduct combat operations and programmable and independent systems will require airmen to aid the designers and software engineers with software baselines and tactical updates. A Predator UAV has already been destroyed because its non-aircrew operators did not understand the tactical implications of orbiting a single point at low altitude for an extended period of time. The US Army's Hunter UAV program was canceled due to extremely high accident rates caused by non-aircrew operators. 59 UAVs will fly within federal airspace and will have to follow the FAA airspace rules and procedures. 60 As UAVs become too large to travel in transport aircraft, they will fly to their theaters and be required to conform with international airspace regulations. Airmen already understand these procedures and they understand the consequences when they are not followed. Airmen will provide the following to a force employing UAVs:
1. Provide airmindedness and leadership for the control of MITL UAV operations.
Design mission specific training programs to introduce the concept of airmanship and airmindedness to non-flying control room personnel. Introduce and train control room personnel in crew resource management procedures to provide ground controllers that will function as a team in stressful situations.
2. Airmen will become the specialists for specific UAV airframe capabilities and limitations.
3. Assist in the development of high fidelity simulators to provide realistic training for MITL UAV crews.
4. Assist design and software engineers in the baselining of software for programmable and independent autonomous UAVs. Provide autonomous UAV development teams with the knowledge necessary to conduct developmental and operational UAV flights.
5. Assist design and software engineers with updating tactics in the software baseline of programmable and independent UAVs. Earth. This advantage is not created by technology but by highly trained men and women.
Airmen provide the flexibility and adaptability that is synonymous with airpower. UAVs will play a large role in our future but airmen will be required to ensure that UAVs are employed correctly and manned aircraft will be vital for dealing with the uncertainties of war. US forces must not forget that we face thinking enemies and that a peer competitor will eventually challenge our dominance. Cooperation and unity of effort will be essential to the successful integration of UAVs, for any mission, into our force structure. UAV advocates must understand that UAVs are aircraft and that the Air Force is full of people with developmental and operational experience that can be useful in any UAV programthis includes airmen. UAV opponents-including airmen-must understand that UAVs are a critical part of our future. UAVs will be an essential force multiplier and will enhance each Air Force core competency and thus make the nation stronger.
Notes
Conclusion
People are the decisive factor in war. The vulnerabilities presented by MITL UAVs, the inherent inflexibility of programmable systems, and the risks associated with independent autonomous UAVs present some large difficulties. These problems do not totally outweigh the benefits of UAVs. They do however, present considerable obstacles, when combined with the chaos and uncertainty of war, to continue manned flight operations. Airmen will be required in several future roles. The UAV, however, represents a significant force multiplier and UAV technology should be exploited for all missions, including the most complex, as a complement for manned systems. UAVs should be used in the following areas:
Airpower currently gives the United States an asymmetric military advantage over every nation on Earth. This advantage is not created by technology but by highly trained men and women. Airmen provide the flexibility and adaptability that is synonymous with airpower. UAVs will play a large role in our future but airmen will be required to ensure that UAVs are employed correctly and manned aircraft will be vital for dealing with the uncertainties of war. US forces must not forget that we face thinking enemies and that a peer competitor will eventually challenge our dominance. Cooperation and unity of effort will be essential to the successful integration of UAVs. UAV advocates must understand that UAVs are aircraft and that the Air Force is full of people with developmental and operational experience that can be useful in any UAV program-this includes airmen.
UAV opponents-including airmen-must understand that UAVs are a vital part of our future. UAVs will be an essential force multiplier and will enhance all Air Force core competencies and thus make the nation stronger. To maintain our asymmetric advantage, skilled, cunning operators will be required to handle the uncertainty of war.
